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 Agricultural Development Banks:  Close Them or Reform Them? 
 
 
Agricultural development banks were established to extend credit and other financial 
services to customers considered noncreditworthy by the commercial banking sector. 
Although frequently unprofitable, they play an important role in the fight against rural 
poverty. This article asks if these banks should be closed or if they are worth revamping.  
 
As the 1990s drew to  a close, the world’s leaders resolved to overcome mass poverty and 
undernourishment in the new millennium and to eliminate government subsidies and 
protection, as well as repressive financial policies. They acknowledged the need to replace 
dysfunctional and otherwise distortional economic policies and to emphasize equitable, 
sustainable, and viable financial institutions. The international financial institutions took steps 
to reduce or, in some cases, forgive the debts of the poorest countries and acknowledged 
some of the shortcomings of structural adjustment. They have shown that, where alternatives 
exist, they will support those national organizations  and financial services that reflect their 
key concerns--including sustainability of operations, ability to deliver, stakeholder 
participation, and profitability.  
 
Banks’ outreach and growth declines 
 
In such a climate, what is the future of agricultural development banks, which are frequently 
unprofitable and increasingly seen as the white elephants of development finance? 
Agricultural development banks were  established 20-30 years ago to extend financial 
services, mainly credit at subsidized interest rates, to customers not considered creditworthy 
by the commercial banks. They are largely state-owned and funded by governments and 
international donor agencies. In general, agricultural development banks have focused on 
providing credit rather than on accepting deposits, a practice that has undermined their self-
reliance as well as their viability.  
 
Given the high cost of administering large numbers of small loans, the banks have tended to 
provide bigger loans to better-off farmers. Because farming is a seasonal occupation, 
agricultural lending institutions experience the boom and bust of cash flows, with loan 
requirements drastically increasing during the sowing season. In addition, an emphasis on 
providing loans strictly for agricultural activities, mainly crop production, as opposed to 
providing credit for other kinds of rural income-generating activities has l imited the potential 
of agricultural development banks to serve a wider clientele. Such preferential credit 
programs have tended to curtail rather than expand the outreach to small farmers and other 
customers in rural areas.   
 
Because they are government  owned, the agricultural development banks have frequently 
been subject to repressive financial measures, such as controlled exchange and interest rates, 
as well as to political expediencies and vested interests. Interest rate regulation has prevented 
them  from covering their costs and has restricted the access of the poor to financial services. 
These banks have also remained largely unsupervised, and the de facto exemption from 
prudential banking regulations and from effective monitoring and supervision of  their 
activities has brought many of them close to insolvency. Interestingly, these constraints have 
applied to institutions operating in both centrally planned and free market economies.   
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International Fund for Agricultural Development  
 
The fate of agricultural development banks is especially critical to the work 
of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),  an 
international financial institution and specialized agency of the United 
Nations. Established in 1977, IFAD has a unique mandate to combat hunger 
and poverty in  low-income regions. A s part of its mandate, IFAD has 
traditionally provided loans to farmers and farmers’ groups through 
agricultural development banks and other rural financial institutions. 
 
A sustained impact is crucially important. Thus, IFAD has also explored 
ways of providing credit through other institutions, among them financial 
cooperatives and, for example in West Africa, local institutions that build on 
ancient indigenous traditions. At the same time, IFAD is among those 
leading the debate on how to reform existing formal sector institutions, such 
as agricultural development banks. 
 
With about one-fourth of its portfolio dedicated to rural finance activities, 
IFAD is currently preparing guidelines to address the main difficulties that 
have beset the rural financial institutions, including agricultural development 
banks. The guidelines focus on improving access by the rural poor—as users 
and user-owners—to sustainable financial institutions that mobilize their own 
resources, cover their costs from their operating income, and finance their 
expanding outreach from the profits. IFAD mobilizes resources and 
knowledge through a strategic, complementary, and dynamic coalition of 
clients, governments, financial and development institutions, 
nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.  
 
The bulk of IFAD’s resources are made available to low-income countries on 
highly concessional terms, repayable over 40 years, including a grace period 
of 10 years and a yearly service charge of 0.75 percent.  Between its 
establishment in 1977, and 1999, IFAD provided nearly $7 billion in loans 
and grants for 550 projects with a total cost of $19.3 billion in 115 countries. 
 
Additional material is available at: www.ifad.org 
With a few laudable exceptions, primarily in Asia, agricultural d evelopment banks have also 
suffered from the reluctance of both public and private sector interests to implement policies 
and reforms that recognize that the poor are bankable--that they can save, invest, and repay 
their loans.  
 
To develop their agricultural activities and microenterprises, prepare for emergencies, and 
provide for the future, the poor need access to a range of microfinance services, in particular 
savings deposit facilities, credit, and insurance. 
 
It is not surprising that the agricultural development banks often become unsustainable. In at 
least two regions--Africa and Latin America--a number of them have been closed down.  
Among those remaining, many 
are technically bankrupt, but 
continue to limp along, unable 
to attract substantial new 
funding.  They also lack the 
managerial wherewithal to 
diversify and enhance customer 
services  -- for example, by 
enabling women farmers and 
other traditionally 
disadvantaged groups to both 
save and borrow.   
 
Successful reform stories 
 
Reform--which requires 
operational autonomy and 
freedom from political 
interference--entails setting up 
an appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework with 
prudential norms and effective 
internal control and external 
supervision. Two agricultural 
development banks that 
reformed successfully are the 
Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) in Thailand and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).   
 
In October 1998, BAAC, with 4.8 million clients representing some 86 percent of all farm 
households in the country, came under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand for the first 
time in its 34-year history. It is now subject to prudential regulation, such as capital-adequacy 
requirements and loan-loss provisioning. More stringent rules and performance standards 
may be painful  in the short term but will help BAAC in its struggle for financial viability and 
self-sustainability in the longer term. 
 
BAAC’s reforms were actually staggered over more than thirty years. In the beginning, the 
bank depended almost exclusively on capital  from the government for operating funds.   3
 
Allocations often arrived late, and the inflow of funds was difficult to synchronize with 
farmers’ seasonal credit needs. The result was a chronic funding shortage. Loan recovery 
rates dropped to as low as 51 percent in the early 1970s, and by 1974, administrative costs 
had risen to more than 8 percent, threatening BAAC’s financial viability. 
 
In 1975, the Bank of Thailand adopted an agricultural credit policy stipulating that 
commercial banks would initially have to lend 5 percent--and 20 percent subsequently--of 
their portfolio to the agricultural sector. Under this policy, the banks could either lend the 
amount directly to farmers or deposit with BAAC any portion of the quota that they could not 
disburse directly.  This policy marked a turning point in BAAC’s operations, and the 
increasing availability of commercial bank deposits made up for the BAAC’s shortage of 
funds. Other measures were also taken, including shifting from wholesale lending through 
agricultural cooperatives, to retail lending to individual farmers organized into joint-liability 
groups. By 1987, BAAC had formed about 100,000 joint-liability groups involving 1.5 
million members, compared with 821 agricultural cooperatives.   
 
Between 1988 and 1996, the Bank of Thailand eliminated interest rate ceilings on the fixed 
deposits of commercial banks and eventually liberalized all interest rates. Restrictions were 
removed on the opening of branches, and commercial banks were allowed to offer a wide 
range of f inancial products in rural areas. By 1998, BAAC had increased the number of its 
branches to 535 from 82. While commercial banks were expanding their lending portfolios 
and reducing their deposits, BAAC was increasing its outreach and savings mobilization t o 
the point where rural deposits became its main source of funds. Moreover, following 
Thailand’s financial and economic crisis in 1997, BAAC was seen as a safer haven than its 
commercial competitors and received significant inflows of deposits. 
 
BRI’s experience shows what can be achieved under deregulation. Since 1984, BRI has been 
a major provider of microfinance, mobilizing microsavings and offering small and micro 
loans to individuals and groups at the village level. By 1989, BRI was able to fully finance its 
village lending activities from locally mobilized savings. Since then, the growth of savings 
has outpaced that of loans, testifying to a strong demand by the rural poor for deposit 
services. By 1999, its 3,700 rural subbranches had 2.5 million active borrowers and some 20 
million savings accounts. Among the three leading rural financial institutions in Indonesia, 
BRI accounts for 78 percent of savings account deposits and 52.2 percent of all loan 
accounts.  
 
By implementing sound policies, including  a massive staff retraining program, this formerly 
frail government-owned agricultural development bank made its microfinancing unit a 
tremendous success. Part of this success stems from the bank’s recognition of the need to 
reach out to the rural poor as w ell as to wealthier clients. BRI benefited from interest rate 
deregulation and a management initiative to commercialize operations by transforming its 
subbranches  into self-sustaining profit centers.  For example, it offered its staff profit-sharing 
incentives. The bank covers its costs from the interest rate margin and finances expansion 
from its profits; its long-term loss ratio is only 2.1 percent. 
 
Even during the recent Asian banking crisis, BRI’s microbanking unit remained profitable:  
the only profitable entity among the government-owned banks. At the peak of the crisis in 
June-August 1998, the demand for credit stagnated because of a general lack of confidence in 
the market. At the same time, however, BRI attracted 1.29 million new savers, leading to an 
increase in the volume of savings deposits in both nominal and real terms.    4
 
Framework of reform 
Overall objective 
Transform agricultural development banks into viable 
and sustainable providers of financial services to all 
segments of the rural population, including the poor 
Key results to be achieved 
• Achievement of the political will to reform or close 
• Adequate reform strategies (for example, privatization) 
• An effective planning process 
• Operational autonomy and freedom from political 
interference 
• An appropriate legal and regulatory framework with 
prudential norms 
• Financial restructuring 
• Organizational restructuring 
• Human resource development, including staff 
retraining 
• Effective delivery system (decentralized network of 
branches as profit centers) 
• Demand-driven deposit, credit, and other financial 
products 
• Financial sustainability 
• Effective internal control and external supervision 
 
Preconditions for reform 
 
The experiences of BAAC and BRI suggest that reforming the agricultural development 
banks may  be feasible and that the financial performance and outreach can be greatly 
improved, but only if certain preconditions exist to facilitate their rehabilitation. Among 
these, a favorable financial sector climate, an effective demand for rural financial services, 
and a real commitment to profitability and sustainability of operations are essential. 
 
Despite the difficulties that have beset agricultural development banks in most parts of the 
world, they have continued to provide important financial services through their branch 
networks. In regions where these banks have been closed, their market share has generally 
not been filled by other financial institutions. In addition, after several decades of operation, 
these banks have accumulated valuable customer information that would be expensive and 
time-consuming to replicate. 
 
Any financial institution following some practices can become sustainable and combine 
outreach and viability. But generally, institutions built on principles of self-reliance and 
private ownership have better prospects. To maximize their outreach, institutions must be 
financially sustainable:  they must be able to cover all their costs, mobilize their own 
resources, protect their funds against erosion from inflation and nonrepayment of loans, and 
make a profit to finance their expansion. 
 
Clearly, the political will either to close loss-making institutions or to implement effective 
reforms is essential. A consensus is needed 
among development and financial 
institutions, including the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and the 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) (see box), together 
with the IMF and bilateral donors. 
Governments also need to be pressured to 
implement reforms with implications for their 
own fiscal and prudential regulatory and 
supervisory policies.  
 
In the 1990s, a political consensus emerged, 
through a variety of international forums, in 
favor of promoting sustainable forms of rural 
banking, including credit, savings schemes, 
and other financial services to poor women 
and men.  The recent financial crisis  in Asia 
has also highlighted the need for closer 
scrutiny and regulation of financial 




The essence of agricultural development bank reform would be to transform these banks into 
viable and sustainable providers of financial services to a wide-ranging rural clientele (see   5
 
table). In many cases, reform would mean financial and organizational restructuring, staff 
retraining, and human resource development. It c ould also entail cleaning up a bank’s 
portfolio of bad debts, which may require consolidating loss-making state-owned enterprises.  
Such enterprises are among the major customers of agricultural development banks. As with 
commercial credit institutions, agricultural development banks should concentrate on 
demand-driven financial products tailored to the actual needs of rural customers, with a 
particular emphasis on the very poor, who in many developing countries form the majority of 
the population. For this reason, effective outreach implies the establishment of a 
decentralized network of branches that work as profit centers. 
 
The challenge is to find a way for all the stakeholders -- donor institutions, governments, and 
the rural community  -- to work together for reform. Institutions like IFAD, with a long 
history of assisting the rural financial sector, will continue to work in this area to improve 
financial institutions’ viability and outreach to the poor with demand-driven financial 
services. Innovation s hould not necessarily imply establishment of new organizations when it 
might be more cost effective, although at times politically more sensitive, to reform an 
existing ones.  
 
 
 
 
 